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Employment Law: McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Co. and After-Acquired Evidence - A
Convincing Resolution to Employer/Employee Mis-
conduct or an Incomplete Assessment of the Issue?
L Introduction
Since the inception of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' (Title VII), the
Age Discrimination in Employment Ace (ADEA), and other federal an-
tidiscrimination laws, employers and employees have been in a silent battle with
each other. Employers are cautious in how they approach hiring and terminating
personnel, fearing possible litigation based on discrimination. Employees, on the
other hand, have powerful statutory remedies available to them when an employer
discriminates. Congress enacted Title VII in 1964 to create a "national policy of
nondiscrimination" in the workplace by prohibiting discrimination by employers?
Similarly, in passing the ADEA, Congress sought to eradicate arbitrary age
discrimination against any employee over forty.
The policy of the ADEA is "to promote employment of older persons based on
their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment;
[and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from
the impact of age on employment."5 Title VII attempts to prevent discrimination
in employment based on race, color, sex, religion, or national origin.6 In most
instances, courts interpret both Title VII and the ADEA liberally in order to further
the goal of ending discrimination in the workplace
One of the questions associated with Title VII, the ADEA, and other an-
tidiscrimination statutes is whether employees have a legitimate cause of action for
wrongful termination based on alleged discrimination when the employer
subsequently discovers some form of employee misconduct that would have been
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for dismissal. After-acquired evidence in an
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633(a) (1994).
3. See 110 CoNG. REc. 13,169 (1964).
4. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
prohibits discrimination on the basis of age in hiring, termination, employment opportunities,
compensation, and all other terms and conditions of employment against employees and job applicants
who are age forty and above. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
7. See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding that Title VII was "broad-
gauged innovation legislation" that should be regarded as "a character of principles which are to be
elucidated and explicated by experience, time, and expertise").
8. The term "after-acquired evidence" in the employment context originated in the Tenth Circuit with
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employment discrimination case consists of information regarding an employee's job
application fraud9 or misconduct at work' that the employer discovers after the
employee has been terminated and subsequently files a discrimination claim." An
employer that asserts the after-acquired evidence defense has the burden of
demonstrating that the employee's misconduct was so severe that he or she would
have been terminated immediately upon discovery of the misconduct or not hired
in the first place.
In the past, there was a considerable split in the United States Courts of Appeal
regarding the application of the after-acquired evidence doctrine. Some circuits,
including the Tenth and Sixth, believed that after-acquired evidence was a complete
bar to recovery. 3 Cther circuits, including the Eleventh and Third, merely
decreased the amount of damages an employee could receive. 4 This discrepancy
in the circuits concering after-acquired evidence continued until January 1995,
when the United States Supreme Court decided McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Co.5
Although the McKennon decision directly addresses after-acquired evidence in
situations where the employee acts in a manner that warrants termination while on
the job, the decision fails to consider instances where employees intentionally make
material misrepresentations on r6sum6s and job applications in order to secure
employment. This note will focus on the Court's decision in McKennon, specifically
on how the after-acquired evidence doctrine will affect employees asserting a
discrimination claim and employers defending such allegations. The impact of
McKennon on previous Tenth Circuit and Oklahoma cases.involving after-acquired
evidence will be addressed, as will the ramifications the decision will have on the
mixed-motive theory of discrimination. An analysis of how the Court's decision will
affect misrepresentations made on rdsum6s and job application forms will also be
discussed in order to illustrate that McKennon is a cautious decision that fails to
completely assess the issue of after-acquired evidence in this context. Additionally,
this note will review recent Tenth Circuit opinions regarding after-acquired evidence
the decision Summers v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
9. See O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 12 F.3d 176, 177-78 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1086
(1995).
10. See, e.g., Smith v. Equitable Life Assurance Socy, No. 90 Civ. 7742 (JFK), 1993 WL 15485,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1993).
11. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1228 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S.
Ct. 1397 (1995).
12. See Jay W. Walis, The U.S. Supreme Court Will Review the 'After-Acquired Evidence' Doctrine
and Whether It Bars an Employee's Right to Any Recovery, NATL LJ., June 27, 1994, at B4.
13. See ODriscoll v. Hercules, 12 F.3d 176, 180-81 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1086
(1995); Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 975 F.2d 302, 305 (6th Cir. 1992); Dotson v. United
States Postal Serv., 977 F.21 976, 978 (6th Cir. 1992); Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 864
F.2d 700, 709 (10th Cir. 1988).
14. See Mardell v. Hatleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1238 (3d Cir. 1994). vacated, 115 S.
Ct. 1397 (1995); Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1184 (lth Cir. 1992).




and analyze the prospective course of Tenth Circuit decisions in light of the
McKennon decision.
II. Tenth Circuit Law Prior To McKennon
In 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided
Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co."6 In Summers, the Tenth
Circuit held that courts should grant a motion for summary judgment to an
employer charged with discrimination if the employer can prove that after-acquired
evidence of the employee's misconduct, if discovered prior to termination, would
have resulted in the employee's dismissal. 7 The court held that summary judgment
was appropriate even if the after-acquired evidence was not the reason for the
employee's discharge."
In Summers, the fifty-six-year-old plaintiff brought an action against his employer
for age and religious discrimination. 9 Four years after the plaintiff filed the lawsuit
and nearly four years after being terminated, the employer discovered over 150
instances in which the employee had falsified records.' Before discovering the
plaintiffs egregious acts, the defendant reprimanded the plaintiff for numerous
instances of misconduct and informed him that further wrongful actions would lead
to termination.2 The employer asserted that if it had known that the plaintiff was
falsifying records, it would have terminated him immediately. '
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff did not suffer any injury as a result
of the termination because he would have been legitimately fired had the employer
known of his misconduct at the time of its occurrence.' By affirming the district
court's summary judgment ruling, the Tenth Circuit essentially allowed after-
acquired evidence to serve as a complete bar to an employee's discrimination
claim.'
In O'Driscoll v. Hercules Inc.,' the Tenth Circuit court followed the reasoning
in Summers regarding after-acquired evidence. The plaintiff, O'Driscoll, was a
quality control inspector for the defendant Hercules Inc.' The defendant ter-
minated the plaintiff, who subsequently brought an action alleging discrimination
16. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
17. See id. at 708.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 702.
20. See id. at 703.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 708.
23. See id. at 708-09.
24. The Summers court compared the case to a company doctor who is fired because of his age,
race, and religion. While defending the action the company discovered that the terminated employee was
not a doctor. The court stated that "the masquerading doctor would be entitled to no relief and Summers
is in no better position." Id. at 708.
25. 12 F.3d 176 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1086 (1995).
26. See id. at 177.
19971
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under the ADEA and Title VIIz While preparing for trial, the defendant
discovered evidence of r6sum6 fraud, including misrepresentations of age, date of
graduation from high school, and the age of the plaintiffs son for insurance
purposes.' Furthermore, the defendant discovered evidence of other fraudulent acts
which, if discovered before her termination, would have justified firing her.29 In
support of the defendant's claim for summary judgment, the company presented an
employment application which the plaintiff signed at the inception of her
employment stating that any misrepresentations would result in immediate
termination."
The court relied on three elements originally espoused in Summers that must be
met in order for a defendant to have a valid defense based on after-acquired
evidence. First, the employer must be unaware of the misconduct when it discharges
the employee?' Second, the misconduct by the employee must be severe enough
to justify termination.' Third, the employer must prove it would have discharged
the employee had it known of the misconduct?3 The O'Driscoll court determined
that in light of the Summers holding, the plaintiff had the burden to prove that there
was a genuine issue of material fact after the defendant established there was after-
acquired evidence. 4 The court determined that the plaintiff failed to establish a
genuine fact as to whether Hercules would have fired the plaintiff had it known of
the repeated misrepresentations.' As a result of the false information made by the
plaintiff on her employment application, the court precluded her from receiving any
relief for her disqrimination claim.'
II. Oklahoma Law Prior to McKennon
Mosley v. Truckstops Corp. of America7 is the only case decided by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court prior to McKennon which addresses the after-acquired
evidence doctrine." In Mosley, the Oklahoma Supreme Court refused to extend the
Summers holding regarding after-acquired evidence to a workers' compensation
case.39 In Mosley, the plaintiff injured himself while on the job.' After seeking
27. See id.
28. See id. at 178.
29. See id. at 177-78.
30. See id at 178.





36. See id. at 180-31.
37. 891 P.2d 577 (Olda. 1994).
38. In terms of quantity, Oklahoma law is limited in the employment area. The majority of
employment discrimination claims are brought in federal court under Title VII or other federal statutes.
The Mosley case interpreted the Tenth Circuit's decisions on after-acquired evidence and applied it to the
worker's compensation am
39. See Mosley, 891 P.2d at 582.




medical advice regarding his injury, the plaintiff contacted his employer concerning
his employment status.41 The plaintiff alleged that his employer fired him after
being informed that he intended to file a workers' compensation claim.42 Conver-
sely, the defendant contended that it terminated the plaintiff for job abandonment
because of excessive absences.43
After firing the plaintiff, the defendant discovered several additional instances of
the former employee's misconduct. In the plaintiffs application for employment, he
failed to list a prior felony conviction and included an ex-wife on his health
insurance enrollment." Even though there was evidence of employee misconduct,
the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff!' The Oklahoma Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded the case to decide, inter alia, whether the court
should have given a jury instruction consistent with the Summers holding.'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that it was reversible error for the Oklahoma
Court of Appeals to reverse and remand the trial court's verdict because the
defendant did not request a jury instruction regarding the limitation of damages
based on after-acquired evidence 7 The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that the
Court of Appeals' incorporation of the Summers standard into Oklahoma's retaliatory
discharge law was incorrect." The court pointed out that the Summers rationale
had never been extended beyond the realm of civil rights employment discrimination
violations.49 It determined that applying Summers to workers' compensation claims
under Oklahoma statutory law' violated public policy by allowing employers to
circumvent the established workers' compensation structure."' The court refused to
obscure the true issue of the case, retaliatory termination, by requiring a jury
instruction on after-acquired evidence
41. See id. at 579.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 580.
45. See id.
46. See id. The court of appeals reversed the jury verdict in the trial court because it believed that
ajury instruction regarding after-acquired evidence could have affected the award of damages in the case.
See id. at 581. This analysis is similar to the United States Supreme Court holding in McKennon,
discussed infra notes 62-93 and accompanying text.
47. See Mosley, 891 P.2d at 580 n.8.
48. See id. at 583.
49. See id. at 582.
50. Before amendment in 1994, title 85, section 5 of the Oklahoma Statutes provided:
No person, firm, partnership or corporation may discharge any employee because the
employee has in good faith filed a claim, or has retained a lawyer to represent him in said
claim, instituted or caused to be instituted, in good faith, any proceeding under the
provisions of Title 85 of the Oklahoma Statutes, or has testified or is about to testify in
any such proceeding. Provided no employer shall be required to rehire or retain any
employee who is determined physically unable to perform his assigned duties.
85 OKLA. STAT. § 5 (1991) (amended 1994).
51. See Mosley, 891 P.2d at 583.
52. See id.
1997]
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Instead of applying the Tenth Circuit's holding in Summers, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court in Mosley reaffirmed prior precedent that any federal court standard
an Oklahoma court adopts is not a complete acceptance of federal employment
discrimination law as applied to state-based retaliatory discharge claims." The
Mosley court referred to Mantha v. Liquid Carbonic Industries,' which held that
an employer's use of post-termination reasons to justify the dismissal of an
employee would stand in direct conflict with previous Oklahoma court holdings."
Due to the established state case law and the Oklahoma workers' compensations
statute, the Mosley court concluded that the Summers rationale would be inconsistent
with Oklahoma retaliatory discharge jurisprudence.'
Even though Oklahoma courts have not ruled on a case involving after-acquired
evidence in the area of employment discrimination, the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
holding in Mosley suggests that the state would not bar a discrimination claim under
McKennon even if there was evidence of r6sum6 or job application misrepresen-
tations. The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated in Mosley that the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Summers was contrary to public policy because it interfered with the
function of state statutes.' Therefore, it is likely that Oklahoma courts will allow
plaintiffs to bring wrongful termination claims against former employers under state
antidiscrimination statutes even if there is after-acquired evidence of rdsum6 or job
application fraud.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently implied that it would not bar a plaintiffs
claim for wrongful termination under state antidiscrimination statutes. In Brown v.
Ford," the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma
certified five questions to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.59 The fifth question, "If
53. See Buckner v. General Motors Corp., 760 P.2d 803, 806 (Okla. 1988).
54. 839 P.2d 200 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992).
55. See id. at 203; see also Buckner, 760 P.2d at 806; Thompson v. Medley Material Handling, Inc.,
732 P.2d 461,463 (Okla. 1987). Thompson is a retaliatory discharge case. The Thompson court held that
"when retaliatory motivations comprise a significant factor in an employer's decision to terminate an
employee, even though other legitimate reasons exist to justify termination, the discharge violates the
intent of section 5." Thompson, 732 P.2d at 463.
56. See Mosley, 891 P.2d at 583. There are several Oklahoma cases discussing retaliatory discharge
involving workers' compensation claims. See Buckner v. General Motors Corp., 760 P.2d 803 (Okla.
1988); Thompson v. Medley Material Handling, Inc., 732 P.2d 461 (Okla. 1987); Elzy v. Forrest, 739
P.2d 999 (Okla. 1987); Pierce v. Frankin Elec. Co., 737 P.2d 921 (Okla. 1987). These cases established
four requirements that must be met in a retaliatory discharge case involving workers' compensation
claims: (1) that the protection of title 85, section 5, of the Oklahoma Statutes is limited to good faith
actions taken by an employee who has suffered a work-related injury; (2) that an employer may, without
incurring tort liability, discharge an employee who is physically unable to perform job duties; (3) that
the employee must offer evidence to establish circumstances giving rise to a legal inference that
discharge was significantly motivated by retaliation for the exercise of statutory rights; and (4) that if
retaliation motivations comprise a significant factor in an employer's decision to terminate an employee,
even though other legitimate reasons exist to justify the termination, the discharge violates the intent of
section 5. Mosely, 891 P.2d at 584.
57. See id. at 583.
58. 905 P.2d 223 (Okla. 1995).




the answer to question 5 [sic 4] is 'Yes,' does the doctrine of after-acquired evidence
of employee misconduct bar all relief in an action for retaliatory termination?"
Since the Oklahoma Supreme Court answered the fourth question in the negative,
it did not need to discuss after-acquired evidence. However, the second footnote in
the case implies that the McKennon rationale will be followed when analyzing
situations involving Oklahoma antidiscrimination law.'
IV. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.
The United States Supreme Court in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing
Co.2 attempted to settle the dispute between the Circuits regarding the use of after-
acquired evidence of employee misconduct as a defense in discrimination actions.'
Although McKennon centered on the application of after-acquired evidence to the
ADEA, the unanimous decision also appears to apply to Title VII, as well as the
Americans with Disabilities Act'M (ADA) and the Equal Pay Act" (EPA).'
A. Facts
The petitioner in the action, Christine McKennon, worked for the respondent,
Nashville Banner Publishing Company, as a secretary for over thirty years.67
Nashville Banner terminated McKennon when she was sixty-two years old,
allegedly as part of a cost reduction plan. ' Prior to her dismissal, McKennon
thought that the company was going to fire her because of her advanced age.'
During her final year of employment, McKennon copied several confidential
documents regarding Nashville Banner's financial condition for "insurance" and
"protection" against the possibility of being terminated."0
60. Id.
61. The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated:
We understand the fifth question as calling upon us to settle the issue whether an
employer may interpose after-acquired evidence of an employee's on-the-job misconduct
as a supervening ground for termination to defeat all liability for an earlier wrongful
discharge. While we need not answer this question today, we note that McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., _ U.S. _.., 115 S. Ct. 879, 884, 130 L. Ed.
2d 852 (1995), which dealt with a federal statutory claim for age discrimination would
afford helpful guidance to resolving this issue in the context of a state common-law claim.
Brown, 905 P.2d at 225 n.2.
62. 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
63. See James H. Coil, III & Lori J. Shapiro, Two Wrongs Don't Make a Right: The Supreme Court
Limits After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Actions, EMPLOYEE RELATIONS L.J.,
Summer 1995, at 93.
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
65. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-206 (1994).
66. See Supreme Court Limits After-Acquired Evidence in Bias Cases, LIABILrrv WEEK, Jan. 30,
1995, available in 1995 WL 8596424.
67. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 882.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 883.
70. See id.
1997]
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During depositions regarding McKennon's claim of age discrimination, she
admitted to stealing fiese documents.!' A few days after the depositions, Nashville
Banner wrote McKennon a letter restating its decision to terminate her due to
misconduct?2 The letter also stated that had the company known of her copying
confidential documents, it would have terminated her at once for that reason."
B. Procedural History
Nashville Banner filed for summary judgment against McKennon, stating that her
conduct warranted termination! 4 For purposes of the summary judgment argument,
Nashville Banner conceded that it did terminate McKennon because of her age.75
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted
summary judgment for Nashville Banner, holding that McKennon's conduct
warranted termination and that she could not recover back pay or any other remedy
under the ADEA 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed, following the holding of the Summers court.' The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari78 to resolve the split between the circuits as to whether
after-acquired evidence is a complete bar to recovery for an employee who has
allegedly been discriminated against by the employer.'
C. Holding
The Supreme Court held that the Summers rationale was far too strict in allowing
an employer to completely escape liability from an employment discrimination
allegation simply because of wrongful employee conduct.' The Court reasoned
that it would contradict the deterrence and compensation objectives of the ADEA
to bar liability for alleged discrimination completely as a result of after-acquired
evidence.8 The Court determined that the policies of antidiscrimination legislation
support the notion that an employee should be able to prove his or her






76. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 797 F. Supp. 604, 605 (M.D. Tenn. 1992),
afd, 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 879 (1994).
77. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539, 540 (6th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115
S. Ct. 879 (1995).
78. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 114 S. Ct. 2099 (1994).
79. The following cases discuss the after-acquired evidence doctrine: Welch v. Liberty Mach.
Works, 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994); Smallwood v. United Air Lines, 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1994);
Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1397 (1995);
Kristufek v. Hussman Focdservice Co., 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993); Washington v. Lake County, 969
F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992).
80. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 885.




in termination.' It discerned that a complete bar to recovery, such as in Summers,
discourages employers from evaluating their own practices and procedures aimed
toward eliminating discrimination against protected classes.'
However, the Court realized that employers have a legitimate business interest in
terminating employees who misbehave while on the job.' Therefore, the Court
ruled that an employee who files a discrimination claim cannot become immune
from stated employment policies established by the employer.' In order to placate
employers' interests, the Court limited the amount of compensation a terminated
employee can receive if there is after-acquired evidence regarding wrongful conduct.
Although the Court recognized that each case must be determined individually, it
stated that, "as a general rule.., neither reinstatement nor front pay is an
appropriate remedy. It would be both inequitable and pointless to order the
reinstatement of someone the employer would have terminated, and will terminate,
in any event and upon lawful grounds" upon reinstatement.'
In order to achieve an equitable result, the Court stated that the purpose of
compensation is for the employee to be placed in the same position as if the
discrimination had not occurred.' The Court applied a two-step analysis to
determine the amount of back pay that should be awarded to the employee. First,
trial courts must calculate back pay from the date of the unlawful termination to the
date of discovery of the after-acquired evidence.' Second, courts should "consider
taking into further account extraordinary equitable circumstances that affect the
legitimate interests of either party."'" The Court justified its position by stating that
an absolute rule barring recovery of back pay would undermine the efforts of the
ADEA to alleviate the effects of age discrimination in the workforce.'
The Supreme Court's decision in McKennon focused on whether to affirm the
Summers holding barring any relief for the employee or to overrule the decision and
allow some recovery because of the discriminatory practice. The Court decided that,
in applying after-acquired evidence as a defense to an ADEA claim, some relief is
proper if there was discrimination.9' Of particular importance is the Court's
statement that, "[w]hen confronted with a violation of the ADEA, a district court
is authorized to afford relief by means of reinstatement, backpay, injunctive relief,
declaratory judgment, and attorney's fees."' Such dicta illustrates the Court's
commitment to eliminating discrimination in the workplace even if there is evidence
of employee misconduct. The Court decided that evidence of employee wrongdoing
82. See id. at 885.








91. See id at 884.
92. Id (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994)).
1997]
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in a discrimination case may require the employer only to pay the employee back
pay from the time of the discriminatory practice to the moment the company
discovers the misconduct."
V. Analysis
A. Impact'of the McKennon Decision on Summers
The Supreme Courts decision in McKennon severely limited the Summers
rationale, but it did not overrule it. In rejecting the Summers absolute bar theory,
the Court pointed out that Summers does not take into account the period between
termination and discovery of after-acquired evidence. 4 In Summers, it appears
from the language of the opinion that the court hurriedly decided that the plaintiff
was not entitled to relief based upon his egregious conduct. The Supreme Court's
holding in McKennon mandates a careful weighing of the evidence before any
determination can be made with respect to the amount of relief awarded. The Court
did not overrule Summers to the extent that after-acquired evidence of employee
misconduct is irrelevant. Instead, the Court tempered its reasoning with equitable
principles to establish that there must be a careful weighing of all the issues.
The Supreme Court in McKennon allowed the plaintiff to recover because her
reason for stealing the confidential documents was that she feared being terminated
based on her age. 5 However, in other situations, the Court might not award back
pay or any type of relief because of the egregious nature of the act. For example,
if an employer discovers, after terminating the employee for a discriminatory reason,
that the employee engaged in sexual harassment of co-workers, the employee might
not be entitled to recovery based on a public policy against sexual harassment. The
court may determine that a person who violates the same statute that he is asserting
for relief, Title VII for example, may not be entitled to recovery. Similarly, after
terminating an employee, an employer who discovers that the worker engaged in
selling drugs or other criminal activities while on the job might not have to pay any
damages since the public policy of deterring such conduct might outweigh any claim
of discrimination.'
B. McKennon and the Civil Rights Act of 1991
The Civil Rights Act of 1991' probably influenced the Supreme Court's decision
in McKennon. The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins" reaffirmed the
rationale expressed in Summers that an employer can escape liability if it establishes
that it would have fired the plaintiff regardless of discrimination." However,
Congress expressly overruled this theory by enacting the Civil Rights Act of
93. See id. at 886.
94. See Coil & Shapiro, supra note 63, at 97.
95. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 885.
96. See Coil & Shapiro, supra note 63, at 97.
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000 (1994).
98. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).





° In the Act, Congress amended Title VII to provide that if the protected
characteristic (gender, race, religion, etc.) was a "motivating factor" in the decision
to terminate or not hire an individual, liability could be found."'
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 diminished the impact of mixed-motive
discrimination cases like Price Waterhouse. In traditional mixed-motive cases, an
employer makes an adverse employment decision concerning an employee for both
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory reasons. Comparatively, cases involving after-
acquired evidence occur when employee misconduct is discovered after an alleged
discriminatory act by the employer. Although the timing of discovering employee
misconduct distinguishes mixed-motive cases from those involving after-acquired
evidence, both hinge on whether the employer's discriminatory practices injured the
employee. Under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, if the employee establishes that
discrimination played a part in the employer's decision to terminate, the employer
can then rebut the argument by stating that the decision to fire the employee would
have been made regardless of the discrimination." z If the employer can prove this,
the Act limits the relief available to plaintiffs to attorney fees, costs, and injunctive
relief. 3 The Act forbids awarding back pay, reinstatement, hiring, or
promotion." Therefore, some relief is now permitted in mixed-motive cases, as
long as the plaintiff can prove that a discriminatory reason was part of the
employer's motivation rather than the sole reason for the action. 5
The McKennon decision closed the gap between after-acquired evidence and
mixed-motive cases. Some courts suggest that the Summers approach to after-
acquired evidence was inconsistent with the Civil Rights Act of 1991."° Congress'
amendments to Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 made it easier for an
employee to assert a successful claim of employment discrimination. Now, even a
nondiscriminatory motive is insufficient to bar a discrimination claim completely if
there is also evidence of animus toward a protected class."° It would have been
inconsistent for the Supreme Court in McKennon to bar claims under the ADEA in
cases where the nondiscriminatory reason to terminate employment is found after
the fact.
100. See Cheryl Krause Zemelman, Note, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment
Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title V11 and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46
STAN. L. REV. 175, 203 n.203 (1993).
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-5g (Supp. V 1993).
102. See id.
103. Id. § 2000e-5(g).
104. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (1994).
105. See Smith v. Conway Org., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 196, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
106. See Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 994 (D. Or. 1994) ("Summers is...
inconsistent with section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ... which provides that the employee is
a prevailing party for attorney's fees purposes so long as discrimination was a motivating factor in his
termination, even if the employer would have taken the same action anyway for other reasons.").
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(12)(B) (1994).
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C. McKennon and Pre-Employment Fraud
The Supreme Court in McKennon addressed whether after-acquired evidence
should bar a discrimination claim when the employee's wrongdoing occurs during
employment. However, McKennon failed to address whether misrepresentations on
a job application or rdsum6 warrant awarding back pay to the employee.
A common operation of the after-acquired evidence doctrine involves cases of
rdsum6 or job application fraud." s The problem of pre-employment misrepresen-
tations is widespread. A 1992 study of two hundred randomly selected r6sumds
revealed that 3% of the applicants falsely claimed they had a college degree; 3%
listed false employers; 3% claimed employment at fictitious jobs; 4% listed
incorrect job titles; 11% percent did not state the true reason for leaving their
previous employer, and almost 33% listed dates of employment that were incorrect
by at least three months." According to reports, a significant number of people
ages fifteen to thirty are willing to lie, steal, and cheat at work and in school, and
33% said that they would lie on a rdsum6."' Several courts have considered
whether the McKennon holding covers employee fraud in the application process.
In Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co.," the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that McKennon applies to instances of
employee fraud in the application process."' The plaintiff in Wallace asserted
numerous claims against the defendant including violations under Title VII, the
Equal Pay Act, retaliatory discharge, and for assault, battery, and invasion of
privacy."3 During a- deposition of the employee, the defendant learned that the
plaintiff had a criminal conviction for possession of marijuana."1 4 On the
employment application, the plaintiff answered "no" to the question, "Have you ever
been convicted of a crime?""1 5 The defendant moved for partial summary
judgment, claiming that the falsification of the information on the employment
application was against company policy and was a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for termination."
6
The Wallace court reasoned that there are two objectives of antidiscrimination
legislation such as the ADEA, Title VII, and the Equal Pay Act: each act grants to
the employee "a right of action to obtain the authorized relief.'""7 Also, the
108. See Waks, supra note 12, at B4.
109. See Joan E. Rigd on, Deceptive Rdsurads Can )Be Door-Openers But Can Become an Employee's
Undoing, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1992, at B1.
110. See Dennis Kelly, Lies Part of Students'Lives, USA TODAY, Nov. 13, 1992, at IA.
111. 62 F.3d 374 (11th Cir. 1995).
112. See id. at 379.




117. Id. at 378-79 (qaoting McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct 879, 884
(1995)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994) (authorizing private actions under the Equal Pay Act; 29
U.S.C. § 626(c) (1994) (authorizing private actions under the ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(O(1) (1994)




employee seeking redress from the alleged discrimination "vindicates both the
deterrence and compensation objectives of the Acts."". The Wallace court
determined that an employee would be barred from obtaining the deterrence and
compensation objectives of the antidiscrimination laws if they lacked standing to sue
because of misrepresentations on a job application."9 The court cited two other
cases supporting its contention that employees should not be prevented from
asserting a claim because of employment application fraud."2
An argument can be made that the court's holding in Wallace ignores the basic
premise that, if the employee had not falsified information on his r6sum6 or
application, he would not have been hired and, thus, in a position to be a victim of
discrimination. Using a simple "but for" analysis, employees would not have a
discrimination claim against the employer "but for" their misrepresenting infor-
mation on their r6sum6. As one court has pointed out, the McKennon Court did not
directly address this situation because the plaintiffs wrongdoing in that case -
stealing company documents - occurred after hiring.' However, the Supreme
Court in McKennon did hold that equitable considerations can be used in each case
to determine the type of relief that should be awarded."
It has been argued that inquiring into whether the person would have been hired
"but for" the r6sum6 fraud fails to recognize employees who perform successfully
without adequate qualifications." This argument could apply in limited cases
where the misleading information on the r6sum6 or application is not material to
the necessary skills for the job. An example of this situation would be a person
applying for a sales associate position in a department store who falsely claims on
the application that he or she has a college degree.
However, where the misleading information is integral to the position, this
analysis does not apply. For example, a person applying as a counselor at a hospital
claiming that he or she has a degree in psychology and, if taken to the extreme, a
person claiming on a r6sum6 that he or she is a graduate of medical school for a
position as a doctor, are both instances where a lack of formal qualifications could
be detrimental to satisfactory job performance.
The liability issues surrounding cases involving after-acquired evidence can also
be compared to remedies that are available for trespassing. In traditional trespass
analysis, a landowner cannot use excessive force to prevent or stop another person
from trespassing on his or her property."= However, if the trespasser is injured
118. Wallace, 62 F.3d at 379 (quoting McKennon, 115 S. Ct at 884).
119. See id. at 379.
120. See Shattuck v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 49 F.3d 1106, 1108 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that
McKennon applies when an employer discovers that a plaintiff lied on their application about his
education); Wehr v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 49 F.3d 1150, 1153 (6th Cir. 1995) (applying
McKennon where the employer discovered that the plaintiff lied about their employment background and
medical history on their rdsum6).
121. See Shattuck, 49 F.3d at 1108 n.3.
122. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
123. See Shattuck, 49 F.3d at 1109.
124. See Bethley v. Cochrane, 77 So. 2d 228, 231 (La. Ct. App. 1955) (holding that defendant
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while on the landowner's property, he or she can receive damages, but the award
can be limited depending on the facts behind the incident.' Similarly, an
employer that discriminates against an employee cannot be excused from the illegal
act simply because the worker misrepresented his or her qualifications in order to
secure employment. However, the employee in litigation regarding the
discrimination has limited recourse against the employer since he or she lied so they
could be hired. The employer can be absolved of any financial liability if the
misrepresentation is egregious. Once again, a careful balancing of the equities of
each factual scenario must be examined to determine if relief is proper.
As a moral issue, all lies or misrepresentations on r~sumds or applications are
deleterious, regardless of how central they are to an individual's job performance.
However, as a practical matter, the more extreme the lie or misrepresentation, the
greater chance the employer can prove it would have terminated the employee for
the act. The weighing of each lie or misrepresentation could be one of the equities
the Supreme Court in McKennon advocated in determining if damages are
appropriate.
The Court held in McKennon that after-acquired evidence of employees who
commit on-the-job misconduct are not barred from an award of back pay."
However, the Court failed to address whether there should be back pay for
employees that misrepresent their qualifications for employment.
It does not seem logical in all instances that an employee who intentionally
misrepresents his or her qualifications, or lies on an application, would be able to
recover back pay for discrimination that would not have occurred without fraudulent
actions. Allowing an employee to collect back pay from the time of the
discriminatory act to the time of judgment can result in a windfall to certain
employees who lied in order to get the job.2" The United States Supreme Court
in McKennon stated that the employer's defense of unclean hands no longer applies
in the context of after-acquired evidence." However, the trial court can weigh the
equities involved in a particular case to determine if any relief is justified.
Employees should be on notice that if they decide to file a discrimination claim,
there is a possibility of decreased or no relief due to their misconduct.
Although discrimination should not be tolerated regardless of the circumstances,
it is debatable whethar people who misrepresent their background or qualifications
should be able to recover for a discrimination claim. In the absence of
discrimination, if an employer discovers that an individual falsified information on
a job application or rdsumd, the person would not be offered a position.
Discrimination in employment situations harms employees, regardless of whether
they have a legitimate right to be employed.' However, the public policy of
landowners shooting of plaintiff trespasser was excessive and unreasonable force).
125. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 77 app. (1966).
126. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
127. See Waks, supra note 12, at B4.
128. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 885.
129. See Robert Brookins, Policy Is the Lodestar When Two Wrongs Collide: After-Acquired




eradicating discrimination in the workforce does not justify an employee reaping
damages from an employer that would not have hired the person had there been no
pre-employment misrepresentation. It is a basic assumption of Title VII, the ADEA,
and other antidiscrimination statutes that the employer/employee relationship is
legitimate. If the relationship is tainted due to material misrepresentations made to
secure employment, a court could deny a plaintiff recovery on a discrimination
claim.'33
Although Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws are supposed to be less
paternalistic than state common laws,' they still attempt to protect the integrity
of individual worth. Congress recognized the pervasive problems associated with
discrimination and passed Title VII to achieve broad social goals.' The basic
policy behind Title VII and similar antidiscrimination statutes is that all individuals
are equal and should not be precluded from employment opportunities because of
prejudice toward protected classes.'
Because Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes attempt to improve
professional relationships by eradicating discrimination in the workplace,'" it
would be illogical for a court to award an employee damages for discrimination
when the employee lied to get the job.'35 Courts would be rewarding impermis-
sible behavior by allowing relief to employees who misrepresent themselves in order
to secure employment.'36 Essentially, courts would be discrediting the entire policy
behind antidiscrimination statutes if employees who lie to secure employment are
allowed relief.
130. There is a recognizable tension between Title VII and pre-employment material mis-
representations. However, it is necessary to consider that in the absence of intentional discrimination,
an individual would not be able to recover under Title VII if the individual falsified statements that
would justify termination.
131. See Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and the Shaping
of Legal Standards, 43 EmORY L.J. 151,204 n.99 (1994) (stating that Title VII struck down paternalistic
state labor laws); Richard G. Kass, Early Retirement Incentives and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 4 HOFMsiA LAB. LJ. 63, 108 (1986) (stating that the ADEA was supposed to eliminate
paternalistic uses of age discrimination laws); Rende L. Cyr, Note, The Americans With Disabilities Act:
Implicationsfor Job Reassignment and the Treatment of Hypersusceptible Employees, 57 BROOK. L. REV.
1237, 1273 (1992) (stating that Title VII approach for analyzing the ADA is preferred because it is less
paternalistic).
132. See Note, supra note 100, at 190.
133. See generally Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979); Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975); Frank S. Ravitch, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation: The
Availability and Structure of a Cause of Action for Workplace Harassment Under the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 15 CAR.DOZO L. REV. 1475, 1485 (1994).
134. See H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 18 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401 (stating
that Title VIIs purpose was "to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal remedial
procedures, discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, or national origin").
135. Cf. Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that trustworthiness,
reliability, veracity, and good judgment are material qualifications for any job).
136. See generally Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1235 (3d Cir. 1994)
(reporting that the employee Mardell misrepresented, inter alia, that she obtained a Bachelor of Science
degree, her professional work experience, and previous job responsibilities), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1397
(1995).
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Although material misrepresentations on job applications and r6sum6s should not
be a complete affirmative defense for employers in discrimination lawsuits, courts
should carefully scrutinize the facts of each case in order to determine if relief is
justified. Although r6sum6 and application misrepresentations do not excuse an
employer's discriminatory acts, there are some instances where awarding damages
to an employee who makes an intentional material misrepresentation to gain
employment would be senseless. In light of the McKennon holding, employers must
implement stringent prescreening techniques of prospective employees.'37
However, such action may not be economically feasible for small companies who
hire people for entry-level positions. Additionally, it is imperative that employers
clearly state in employment applications that any form of misrepresentation or
falsification will result in the applicant not being hired or, if employed, in
immediate termination after discovery. Additionally, an employer should make sure
that all questions on job applications are completely filled out by prospective
employees. These procedures can assist an employer in limiting its potential liability
by establishing that the applicant intentionally misrepresented material facts rather
than merely overlooked the question.
The McKennon decision imposes a heavy burden on employers seeking to use the
after-acquired evidence doctrine as a defense to discrimination claims. By holding
that an employer must establish that the misconduct was severe enough to warrant
termination, the Court increased the employer's burden of proving the employee's
conduct constituted a terminable offense.' To meet this burden, employers will
have to clearly state what actions warrant termination in their employment policy
guides. Employers should categorize what actions will be punished by discipline
other than firing and what actions will result in termination. For example, an
employer should clearly establish in its employment policy guide that stealing from
the company or any other criminal activity will result in immediate termination.
The Court's decision also suggests that employers will have to be more stringent
in the manner in which they punish individual employees. If a company's
employment policy manual states that an employee's conduct will result in
termination, the employer should discharge him or her instead of giving the
employee a second chance. By enforcing its own policies, the employer, when faced
with a discrimination claim, can cite previous examples where similar acts
warranted termination 9
It is unclear how many preventive measures an employer must take to shield
itself from possible discrimination claims by employees who lied on their
applications in order to be hired. Even though the employee has the initial burden
to prove discrimination,"4 the McKennon court heightened the initial burden on
137. See Coil & Shapiro, supra note 63, at 102.
138. See id at 100-01.
139. See id. at 101.
140. The order for establishing a traditional disparate treatment case was first established by the
United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973), and
reaffirmed in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981). Under




employers to carefully examine each application and r6sum6 for truthfulness. As a
result of the McKennon decision, employers will be more reluctant to hire a person
without a costly and time-consuming background check in order to confirm the
validity of the applicant's information and references.
VI. Tenth Circuit Law Since McKennon
Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in McKennon, the Tenth Circuit
decided a case involving after-acquired evidence of job application fraud. In
December 1995, the court in Duart v. FMC Wyoming Corp."" affirmed the trial
court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the employer and denied the
employee relief.'
In Duart, the plaintiff filed complaints with the Wyoming Fair Employment
Practices Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against
his employer, claiming that the defendant terminated his employment because of his
age."'43 He filed two complaints based on Wyoming state law and one based on the
ADEA.
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment which the district court
granted. The court followed the Tenth Circuit decision in O'Driscoll v. Hercules
Inc.'" and decided that there were material misrepresentations in his rdsum6 which
were significant enough to justify termination." Additionally, the district court
found that if the defendant had known of the misrepresentations before employing
the plaintiff, it would not have hired him in the first place."
The Tenth Circuit stated that since the O'Driscoll decision, the United States
Supreme Court decided McKennon and that, therefore, the holding of O'Driscoll
was no longer binding law."7 However, the court noted that even though the
plaintiffs material misrepresentations were no longer an absolute bar to recovery,
there were other factors that warranted affirming the district court's granting of
summary judgment.'
The court articulated that although the plaintiff did present a prima facie case of
age discrimination, the defendant provided a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
terminating the plaintiff - poor job performance.149 Since the plaintiff failed to
to rebut the inference of discrimination by articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its
action. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. The final burden of persuasion ultimately belongs to the plaintiff.
See id. at 252-56.
141. 72 F.3d 117 (10th Cir. 1995).
142. See id. at 120.
143. See id. at 118.
144. 12 F.3d 176 (10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 1086 (1995).
145. See Duart, 72 F.3d at 118.
146. See id.
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show that the defendant's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual, the
plaintiffs claim failed.'
The court also compared the plaintiffs state law discrimination claims with his
federal ADEA cause of action. The court noted that since the McKennon holding
is premised on federal law, state common law claims laws regarding employment
discrimination are not bound by the decision.' The court affirmed the district
court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the employer after assessing the
evidence of the plaintiffs state law claims."
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Duart reaffirms its strong commitment to
employer rights in the wake of the McKennon decision. Although the court
recognized that McKennon softened the strict approach of the previous Tenth Circuit
holdings of Summers and O'Driscoll, the final result was still the same - summary
judgment for the employer. Duart does address the implications of r6sum6 and job
application fraud in light of McKennon; however, the decision compliments the
traditional Tenth Circuit stance of protecting employer rights. Additionally, the
court in Duart stated that since state laws are not affected by the McKennon
decision, there can still be a complete denial of relief for employment discrimination
claims involving after-acquired evidence if the case is filed as a state claim.'
VII. Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court decision in McKennon broadens the realm in
which employees can prevail in an employment discrimination claim. It is a
cautious decision by the Court to placate the employee without seriously damaging
the employer's interests.
The McKennon decision obviously limited the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Summers. However, it is uncertain how the United States Supreme Court will
decide cases involving misrepresentations on employment applications and rdsum6s.
While some circuits hold that misrepresenting information on an application or
r6sum6 does not bar a claim of discrimination, these decisions are merely persuasive
on the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Duart confirms that the
court will attempt to protect the employer in cases involving after-acquired
evidence. Although the Tenth Circuit did recognize the McKennon holding in Duart,
it still denied relief to the plaintiff based on other factors.
McKennon does appear to strike a balance between an employer's and employee's
interests regarding misconduct that occurs after a person has been hired."
However, it leaves open the area of pre-employment misrepresentations. Although





154. See Supreme Court Limits After-Acquired Evidence in Bias Cases, supra note 66 (stating that
the National Chamber Litigation Center, an affiliate of the United States Chamber of Commerce, stated




to uphold Summers is a hint that it would apply the McKennon holding to cases
involving pre-employment misrepresentations. Until the United States Supreme
Court decides the issue, there likely will continue to be debate as to whether pre-
employment misrepresentations fall under the McKennon rationale.
William D. Fisher
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